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ABSTRACT
In the online load balancing problem on related machines, we have
a set of jobs (with different sizes) arriving online, and we need to
assign each job to a machine immediately upon its arrival, so as
to minimize the makespan, i.e., the maximum completion time. In
classic mechanism design problems, we assume that the jobs are
controlled by selfish agents, with the sizes being their private infor-
mation. Each job (agent) aims at minimizing its own cost, which is
its completion time plus the payment charged by the mechanism.
Truthful mechanisms guaranteeing that every job minimizes its
cost by reporting its true size have been well-studied [Aspnes et al.
JACM 1997, Feldman et al. EC 2017].
In this paper, we study truthful online load balancing mecha-
nisms that arewell-behaved [Epstein et al., MOR 2016].Well-behavior
is important as it guarantees fairness between machines, and im-
plies truthfulness in some cases when machines are controlled by
selfish agents. Unfortunately, existing truthful online load balanc-
ing mechanisms are not well-behaved. We first show that to guar-
antee producing a well-behaved schedule, any online algorithm
(even non-truthful) has a competitive ratio at least Ω(√m), where
m is the number of machines. Then we propose a mechanism that
guarantees truthfulness of the online jobs, and produces a sched-
ule that is almost well-behaved. We show that our algorithm has
a competitive ratio of O(logm). Moreover, for the case when the
sizes of online jobs are bounded, the competitive ratio of our al-
gorithm improves toO(1). Interestingly, we show several cases for
which our mechanism is actually truthful against selfish machines.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In the online load balancing problem, we have a group of m ma-
chinesM . Each machine i ∈ M has a speed si , which is the amount
of work it processes in one unit of time. There is a sequence of
online jobs J , arriving in an arbitrary order. Each job j ∈ J has
a size pj , which is the amount of work it must be processed be-
fore completed. In other words, the processing time of job j on
machine i is given by
pj
si
. Upon the arrival of a job, the scheduling
algorithmmust decide immediately which machine the job goes to,
with the objective of minimizing the makespan, i.e., the maximum
completion time on any machine. The problem is often referred to
as the online load balancing problem [2, 3]. In this paper, we con-
sider the non-preemptive and non-migrate setting, i.e., once a job
is scheduled on a machine, it must be processed continuously on
this machine until it is finished.
The problem has been extensively studied for decades. For iden-
tical machines (a special case when si = 1 for all i ∈ M), a (2 −
1
m )-competitive algorithmwas proposed by Graham [12], which is
later improved to 1.9201-competitive by Fleischer and Wahl [11].
For related machines, the current best competitive ratio is 4.311 for
randomized algorithms and 5.828 for deterministic algorithms [3].
The problem in which jobs have arbitrary non-zero arrival times
has also been studied [5, 14, 21].
The game theory setting of this problem is also well-studied. In
this setting, each job is controlled by a selfish agent, whose objec-
tive is to finish its own job as early as possible. The agent is the only
one who knows the size of the job, and for its own interest, it may
misreport the size of the job. In the mechanism design community,
we are interested in load balancing algorithms that are truthful, i.e.,
every job optimizes its own objective by telling the truth. Existing
truthful mechanisms often charge the jobs for being processed. In
this case, the objective of each job is to minimize its own total cost,
which is the completion time of the job plus the payment.
The Greedy algorithm [2] is a classic truthful mechanism (with
competitive ratio O(logm)), which assigns each online job j to the
machine that finishes j the earliest, with tie broken by machine
identity. Since the schedule minimizes the completion time of each
online job, themechanism is truthful. Recently, anO(1)-competitive
truthful mechanism is proposed by Feldman et al. [10]. The main
idea is to set dynamic prices on the machines such that the selfish
behaviors of jobs result in a schedule similar to the one produced
by Slow-Fit [2], an O(1)-competitive (non-truthful) algorithm for
the online load balancing problem on related machines.
Another well-studied game theory model for load balancing as-
sumes that the jobs are given offline, while the machines are con-
trolled by selfish agents, with the speed being its only private infor-
mation [7, 9]. To guarantee truthfulness of machines, a scheduling
mechanism pays the machines for working [1, 16] (otherwise all
machines will misreport a speed of 0 to get rid of any assignment).
Each machine aims at maximizing the payment it receives, minus
its own makespan, which is the time by which all jobs assigned to
it are finished. It has been shown that as long as the scheduling
algorithm is monotone, there exists a payment function such that
the mechanism is truthful [1]. Roughly speaking, monotonicity re-
quires that, if a machine claims a higher speed, then its workload
(or makespan) does not decrease.
A natural and interesting question is, if both the machines and
jobs are controlled by selfish agents, is it possible to design a truth-
ful mechanism with bounded competitive ratio?
In this paper, we make a few steps towards solving this question.
We first show some simple mechanisms that are truthful for both
the jobs andmachines, but have large competitive ratios, e.g.,O(m).
In order to improve the competitive ratio, we relax the truthfulness
of machines to well-behavior of the schedule, which guarantees a
different kind of monotonicity with respect to speeds of machines.
1.1 Well-behaved Schedules
The concept of “well-behaved schedule” was first studied by Ep-
stein et al. [9] for the case when related machines are controlled by
selfish agents. A well-behaved schedule guarantees that a machine
has workload no smaller than that of any slower machine. Note
that well-behavior is closely related to truthfulness. Imagine two
machines with speeds s1 < s2. If the schedule is not well-behaved,
i.e., the faster machine has workload less than that of the slower
machine, then the faster machine has incentive to lie. More specif-
ically, if the faster machine claims speed s21/s2, then its workload
becomes larger: the identities of the two machines are swapped.
Therefore the mechanism is not monotone, and not truthful.
Without knowing the future jobs to arrive, it is very difficult
(or maybe impossible) to achieve a monotone schedule with small
competitive ratio. Since monotonicity is defined on the set of on-
line jobs, which the algorithm is oblivious of, the natural candi-
date algorithm must somehow adopt independent assignment of
jobs, i.e., the assignment of any two jobs are independent. How-
ever, to guarantee a bounded competitive ratio, the assignments of
jobs must be correlated, e.g., if a machine receives many jobs, then
the next one should avoid going to this machine.
On the other hand, well-behavior is a more approachable mea-
surement of the schedule. Indeed, since a well-behaved schedule
guarantees that no matter what jobs may arrive, the faster ma-
chines receive more jobs than slower machines, without knowing
what jobs may arrival, the risk-averse machines have no incentive
to lie.
Unfortunately, existing truthfulmechanisms [2, 10] against strate-
gic jobs are not well-behaved. As a simple example, let us consider
theGreedy algorithm [2]. Imagine that we have twomachines with
speed 1 and 1 + ϵ , respectively, where ϵ > 0 is arbitrarily small.
Let there be two jobs, the first one with size 1 and the second one
with size 1ϵ . Then the slower machine has workload
1
ϵ , while the
faster machine has workload 1, much smaller than the workload
of the slower machine. Actually, as we will show later, being well-
behaved is difficult: any well-behaved algorithm has competitive
ratio Ω(√m).
1.2 Our Results
In this paper, we consider a stronger definition of well-behaved
schedules. We call a schedule well-behaved if the makespan (the
total workload divided by the speed) of a machine is no smaller
than that of any slower machines. Note that under this definition,
a faster machine gets moreworkload than proportional to its speed.
As a consequence, it is more likely for the machines to be truthful,
given that the payment function are defined as in [1].
First, we show that being well-behaved is difficult, even under
the weaker version [9]. We show that there exists a sequence of
online jobs on a group of machines such that any well-behaved
schedule performs badly.
Theorem 1.1 (Hardness of Well-Behaved Schedule). Well-
behaved algorithms have competitive ratios Ω(√m).
On the other hand, we show that if we relax the requirement
of well-behavior slightly, i.e., we require a machine i to have a no
smaller makespan than machine i ′ only if si ≥ 2si ′ , then a much
smaller competitive ratio can be obtained. We propose such kind
of “almost well-behaved” scheduling algorithm that is truthful for
online jobs, and achieves a competitive ratio ofO(logm). Moreover,
we show that the competitive ratio improves to O(1) if the online
jobs have similar sizes.
Theorem1.2. There exists anO(logm)-competitive algorithm that
is truthful for jobs, and produces an almost well-behaved schedule for
any online jobs. Moreover, the competitive ratio improves toO(pmaxpmin )
when pj ∈ [pmin,pmax] for all jobs j ∈ J .
Besides being almost well-behaved, ourmechanism (detailed de-
scription in Section 4) has several other desirable properties.
First, our mechanism is fair in the sense that if two machines
have the same speed, then their workload differs by at most one
job. Our mechanism guarantees that a job is assigned to a ma-
chine only when the machine has the minimum workload among
all machines with the same speed. Indeed, since we break tie ran-
domly, the machines with the same speed have the same expected
makespan. Such fairness is essentially the same with the notion of
envy-free up to any item in resource allocation literature when all
agents have the same entitlement [4, 22]. Second, our mechanism
is anonymous. In our mechanism, we guarantee that the schedule
produced is determined only by the speeds submitted by the ma-
chines, which means that if a machine changes its identity, the re-
sulting schedule remains unchanged. As a consequence, our mech-
anism is also symmetric, i.e., if two machines swap their speeds,
then the resulting workloads will also be swapped. We note that
anonymity and symmetry are also important properties in the co-
operative game theory and facility location literature [20], which
keeps the system stable, and are necessary conditions for Shapley
value [23] or Nash’s bargaining solution [17, 18].
Our Technique. To guarantee that the makespan of a faster ma-
chine is not smaller than that of a slower machine, we assign each
online job to a machine only if the well-behavior is maintained.
In other words, we maintain the invariant that the makespans of
machines are non-decreasing with respect to the speeds, and we as-
sign job j to machine i only if after the assignment, the makespan
of machine i is not larger than that of any faster machine.
Two questions arise. First, how can we make the mechanism
truthful for online jobs, given that sometimes we assign a job to
a machine other than the one that finishes the job the earliest?
Second, is the competitive ratio of the algorithm bounded?
To answer the first question, we use the technique of dynamic
posted pricing [10, 13]. We show that depending on the current
makespans of machines, we can set prices on the machines (which
is the charging to the jobs) such that the selfish behaviors of on-
line jobs result in a well-behaved schedule. As a simple example,
suppose there are two machines with speeds s1 = 1 and s2 = 2,
and the current makespan of machine 1 is 1 while machine 2 has
makespan 2. We set a price 0.5 on machine 1 and price 0 on ma-
chine 2. Then if the next job j has size pj ≤ 1, its cost when going
to machine 1 is 1 + pj + 0.5, which is no larger than 2 + pj/2, the
cost when going to machine 2. On the other hand, if pj > 1, then
going to machine 2 has a strictly smaller cost. Hence the next job
goes to machine 1 only if its size is at most 1, which implies that
the resulting schedule remains well-behaved.
For the second question, in contrast to the Ω(√m) hardness re-
sult, we show that if we only impose the monotonicity on the
makespans of machines whose speeds differ by a factor of 2, then a
much better competitive ratioO(logm) can be obtained. The main
idea is similar to the analysis of the Greedy algorithm [2].We show
that the makespans of machines with speeds s and s2 differ by at
mostO(OPT), as otherwise (by the way we set the dynamic prices)
the jobs will stop going to the faster machines. Combining this
idea with the fact that machines with speed less than sm , where s
is the maximum speed of a machine, has little contribution to the
whole schedule, we can show that the makespan of our schedule
is bounded by O(logm) · OPT.
Interestingly, as illustrating examples, we show that our mech-
anism is indeed truthful in some cases.
Theorem 1.3. Our mechanism is also truthful for machines when
m = 2, or when online jobs have unit size.
As far as we know, our work is the first result that achieves
truthfulness for an online load balancing problem in which both
the jobs and machines are controlled by selfish agents. A natural
and fascinating open question is whether there exist non-trivial
mechanisms that are truthful for both jobs and machines in gen-
eral, and achieve a competitive ratio o(m).
1.3 Other Related Work
Truthful Mechanism for Selfish Machines. The work of schedul-
ing mechanisms against selfish machines was initiated by Nisan
and Ronen [19], in which the case of unrelated machines is studied.
They propose a truthful mechanism (which adopts independent as-
signments of jobs) that ism-competitive, and show that no truthful
mechanism can do better than 2-competitive. The hardness result
has been improved to 1 +
√
2 ≈ 2.414 for 3 or more machines [6],
and to 1+ϕ ≈ 2.618 when the number of machines tends to∞ [15].
On the other hand, the problemon relatedmachines is much eas-
ier. Constant competitive truthful mechanisms are proposed in [1,
16], and the state-of-the-art mechanisms are the deterministic PTAS
by Christodoulou and Kovács [7], and by Epstein et al. [9].
Truthful Mechanism for Selfish Online Jobs. The Greedy algo-
rithm is the most well-known online load balancing mechanism
that is truthful against selfish online jobs. The algorithm has been
shown to be 2-competitive on identical machines [12]; Θ(logm)-
competitive on related machines, andm-competitive on unrelated
machines [2]. Recently, a constant competitive truthfulmechanism
that adopts dynamic posted prices on machines is proposed [10].
There are other works [8, 24] focusing on producing fair sched-
ules in a cooperative game-theoretic perspective. However, since
they do not study the truthfulness of jobs or machines, the model
we study in this paper is different from theirs.
Hardness of Online Load Balancing. In contrast to the PTAS on
related machines obtained when all jobs are given offline, due to
the nature of unknown future, it is impossible to achieve any com-
petitive ratio strictly smaller than 1.5, even on two identical ma-
chines, and when both machines and all jobs are truthful: imagine
2 jobs of size 1, followed by another job with size 2. On related
machines, it is shown in [3] that no deterministic algorithm can
achieve a competitive ratio smaller than 2.438, and no randomized
algorithm can do better than 1.8372-competitive.
2 PRELIMINARIES
In this paper, we use J to denote the set of online jobs to be sched-
uled onm related machines M . Let pj be the size of job j ∈ J , and
si be the speed of machine i ∈ M . The size pj is the only private
information of job j ∈ J . Without loss of generality (by scaling)
we assume that the minimum speed of a machine and the smallest
size of an online job are both 1. Let [k] denote {1, 2, . . . ,k}, for any
positive integer k . We use log to denote log2.
We assume all jobs arrive one-by-one at time 0. There is no dead-
line or weight on the jobs. Each job must be assigned to some ma-
chine immediately upon its arrival. The objective is to assign jobs
to machines to minimize the makespan. In the following, we use
workload on a machine to denote the total size of jobs assigned
to the machine; makespan on the machine to denote its workload
divided by its speed.
Selfish Agents. In our problem, we assume that the jobs are con-
trolled by independent selfish agents, who is the only person that
knows the size of the job. The objective of a selfish job is to min-
imize its own completion time plus payments to the mechanism.
For the case when machines are also controlled by selfish agents,
we assume that only the agent knows the speed of the machine,
and its objective is to maximize (payment - makespan), where the
payment is determined by the mechanism based on the final sched-
ule.
Mechanism. Weconsidermechanisms that operate in two phases.
In phase-1, machines submit their speeds to the mechanism before
any job arrives. In the case whenmachines are selfish, the reported
speed might be different from the true value. The mechanism then
announces the speeds of machines (which might not be equal to
the speeds submitted). In phase-2, each online job arrives and sub-
mits a size to the mechanism. Each online job is informed of the
announced speeds of machines, and the current schedule. Based
on the size of the job, the mechanism decides immediately which
machine the job goes to, together with a charging to the job. Af-
ter assigning all jobs, the mechanism decides a payment to every
machine.
We call a mechanism truthful if and only if every job maximizes
its own utility by telling the truth, i.e., their true sizes. We call
a mechanism well-behaved if the makespan of a machine is no
smaller than that of any slower machine. Throughout this paper,
we useALG andOPT to represent the makespan of ourmechanism
and the offline optimal makespan, respectively.
In the remaining part of this paper, we assume that before the
machines submit their speeds, we fix a random ordering of ma-
chines that is used to break tie (when multiple machines with the
same speed have the same makespan).
2.1 Monotone Schedule
It is shown in [1] that for the case when machines are controlled
by selfish agents, the scheduling mechanism is truthful if and only
if the schedule is monotone.
Definition 2.1 (Monotone). Consider any machine i ∈ M , and fix
the speeds of all other machines arbitrarily. A scheduling mecha-
nism is monotone if the workload of machine i is non-decreasing
w.r.t. the speed of machine i .
More specifically, let L(b) be the workload of the machine when
the claimed speed is 1
b
, i.e., processing one unit of job requires b
units of time. Let
P(b) = b · L(b)+
∫ ∞
b
L(t)dt (1)
be the payment function to the machine. It can be shown that if
L(b) is non-decreasing, then the mechanism (with payment func-
tion (1)) is truthful [1]. For completeness, we give a short proof
here.
Lemma 2.2. The mechanism is truthful if L(b) is non-increasing.
Proof. Let s be the true speed of the machine and b∗ = 1s . It
suffices to show that b∗ maximizes the utility function P(b) − b∗ ·
L(b). We show that ∀b , b∗, we have P(b) −b∗ · L(b) ≤ P(b∗) −b∗ ·
L(b∗).
If b < b∗ (claim to be faster than truth), then we have
P(b) − b∗ · L(b) =
∫ ∞
b
L(t)dt − (b∗ − b) · L(b)
=
∫ ∞
b∗ L(t)dt +
∫ b∗
b
(L(t) − L(b))dt ≤ P(b∗) − b∗ · L(b∗),
where the inequality comes from the fact that ∀t ≥ b , L(t) ≤ L(b).
Similarly for b > b∗ (claim to be slower than truth), then
P(b) − b∗ · L(b) =
∫ ∞
b
L(t)dt + (b − b∗) · L(b)
=
∫ ∞
b∗ L(t)dt +
∫ b
b∗ (L(b) − L(t))dt ≤ P(b∗) − b∗ · L(b∗),
where the inequality comes from L(t) ≥ L(b) for all t ≤ b . 
3 NAÏVE ALGORITHMS
In this section, we present two simple scheduling mechanisms that
are truthful for both the jobs and the machines. Basically, these
mechanisms are two extreme cases, with one allocating all jobs on
a single machine and the other allocating all jobs uniformly. As we
will see, the competitive ratios of the mechanisms are very large.
We first propose a simple VCG-style mechanismMVCG that em-
ploys payments to machines but no charging to jobs. The assign-
ment of jobs is trivial: we assign all online jobs to themachine with
the highest claimed speed.
Mechanism MVCG. Let t1 ≤ . . . ≤ tm be the speeds claimed
by machines, where we break tie by the pre-fixed ordering. We
assign all jobs to machinem, and set the payment to the machine
be 1tm−1
∑
j∈J q j , where q j is the processing time claimed by job j.
For truth-telling machines and jobs, we have ti = si for all i ∈ M
and q j = pj for all j ∈ J .
Truthfulness of MVCG. Observe that the schedule does not de-
pend on the sizes of online jobs, and thus is truthful for jobs (mis-
reporting the size is not beneficial). The mechanism is also truthful
for the machines, as all jobs are processed as a grand bundle, with
size
∑
j∈J pj . A machine is willing to process the bundle only if
its actual processing time on the bundle is less than the payment.
Since the payment is determined by the second highest speed, the
mechanism (which is actually a second price auction) is truthful
for machines (bidders).
Competitive Ratio of MVCG. Since all jobs are assigned to ma-
chine m with the highest speed sm , ALG is the makespan of ma-
chine m. On the other hand, since sm ≥ si for all i ∈ [m], the
processing time of any job on machine m is the smallest among
all machines. Hence in the optimal schedule, the summation of
makespans of all machines is at leastALG. Thereforewe haveALG ≤
m · OPT.
Another simple truthful mechanism MGreedy works as follows.
Regardless of the speeds submitted by the machines, the mecha-
nism announces si = 1 for all machine i , and assigns each online
job to the machine that finishes the job the earliest. In other words,
the mechanism runs the Greedy algorithm on identical machines.
Truthfulness of MGreedy. Obviously, the mechanism is truthful
for online jobs, as the completion time of every job is minimized,
and there is no charging to the jobs. Themechanism is also truthful
for the machines, as the speeds submitted by machines are irrele-
vant to the schedule.
Competitive Ratio of MGreedy. Consider the optimal schedule
(withmakespanOPT). Imagine that we keep the same schedule but
change the speeds of all machines to 1. Let OPT′ be the resulting
makespan, smin = argmin1≤i≤m{si } and smax = argmax1≤i≤m{si }.
Then we have OPT′ ≤ smaxsmin · OPT, as the makespan of every ma-
chine is increased by a factor atmost smaxsmin . Since Greedy is 2-competitive
for load balancing on identical machines, we haveALG ≤ 2·OPT′ ≤
2smax
smin
· OPT.
As it appears to be, since we totally ignore the speeds of ma-
chines, the competitive ratio is determined by how different the
speeds of machines are.
4 A WELL-BEHAVED MECHANISM
As we have shown in the previous section, to achieve complete
truthfulness, we may have to (somehow) ignore the speeds of the
machines, or the sizes of online jobs. However, such kind of algo-
rithms usually suffer from huge competitive ratios.
In this section, we focus on a more approachable measurement
of schedules, the well-behavior. As we have shown in Section 1,
since the machines are oblivious of the online jobs, a well-behaved
mechanism (somehow) guarantees that the risk-averse rational self-
ish machines have no incentive to lie.
4.1 Hardness of Well-behaved Schedules
We first prove in this section that, while it seems natural and easy,
it is actually impossible for awell-behaved scheduling algorithm to
achieve an o(√m) competitive ratio in the online setting. Moreover,
ourΩ(√m) hardness result holds even when jobs and machines are
truthful, and for the weaker definition of well-behavior as given
in [9] (faster machines have no smaller workload).
Proof of Theorem 1.1: Consider a set of machines with speeds
si = 1+2
i−m, where i = 1, 2, . . . ,m. Let there bem online jobswith
different sizes s1, . . . , sm . Obviously, the optimal schedule completes
all jobs before time 1 by assigning the job of size si to machine i .
However, we show that if the jobs arrive in increasing order
of sizes, then any well-behaved schedule has makespan at least
Ω(√m), which yields a Ω(√m) hardness result on the competitive
ratio on any well-behaved scheduling algorithm.
We prove by induction on the jobs that the number of jobs on
the machines that receive at least one job, is strictly increasing
w.r.t. the speed. Note that the statement implies that at the end of
the algorithm, the number of jobs k on the fastest machinem is at
least Ω(√m), as otherwise the total number of jobs assigned is at
most
k(k−1)
2 < m. The statement trivially holds when there is no
job, and after the first job arrives.
Suppose the statement holds true before job j arrives.
We show that the statement holds true after assigning job j,
given that the previous schedule is well-behaved. Suppose job j is
assigned to machine i . It suffices to show that after the assignment,
the number of jobs on machine i is smaller than that of machine
i + 1. Assume the contrary and let c be the number of jobs on both
machines. Then the total workload of machine i is at least c + 2
j
2m ,
while the workload on machine i + 1 is upper bounded by
c∑
l=1
(
1 +
2j−l
2m
)
< c +
2j
2m
.
In other words, the workload (and also the makespan) of machine
i + 1 is strictly less than that of machine i , which contradicts the
definition of well-behaved schedule.
4.2 Rounded Speeds
Observe that well-behavior sometime is not necessary to achieve a
truthful mechanism. For example, recall the mechanism MGreedy
proposed in Section 3. Since the final schedule is irrelevant to the
speeds, well-behavior is not needed to achieve truthfulness. How-
ever, such kind of "speed insensitive" schedules often suffer from
bad competitive ratios. Nevertheless, this idea inspires us to de-
velop a schedule that is almost well-behaved, with a limited speed
insensitivity. By relaxing the requirements slightly, we show that
we can dramatically improve the competitive ratio, from Ω(√m)
to O(logm) for the general case and to O(1) for the case when the
sizes of online jobs are bounded.
Recall that mechanismMGreedy has a competitive ratio propor-
tional to the difference of machine speeds. The main idea behind
the design of our new algorithm is, instead of ignoring the speeds
completely, to achieve a o(√m) competitive ratio, we only regard
a set of machines identical if their speeds are similar, e.g., differ by
a multiplicative factor of 2. This idea motivates the design of the
following mechanismMPPR, where PPR is short for “posted prices
for rounded-down speeds”.
Mechanism MPPR. For every speed si submitted by machine i ,
we round si down to the largest power of 2. In other words, if si ∈
[2k , 2k+1), then the mechanism announces si = 2k . We order the
machines in non-decreasing order of rounded speeds: s1 ≤ s2 ≤
. . . ≤ sm , where we break tie by the pre-fixed ordering. At any
moment, depending on the current makespans of machines, we set
a price ρi on every machine i (that is independent of the incoming
job).When a new job arrives, it goes to themachine that minimizes
its own cost, i.e., behaves selfishly. At the end, let the payment to
machines be defined as in Equation (1).
Although we have not specified how we set the prices on the
machines, we know that as long as the posted prices do not de-
pend on the size of the new job, the mechanism is truthful for jobs
(misreporting the size is not beneficial). From now on, we assume
that every machine has speed equals to some power of 2.
In the following, we show that
(1) there is a way for mechanism MPPR to set prices on ma-
chines such that the resulting schedule is well-behaved: ma-
chine with higher speed has no smaller makespan;
(2) the scheduling algorithm is O(logm)-competitive.
For ease of discussion, we give some necessary definitions first.
Definition 4.1. For any job j, let Ci (j) be the makespan of ma-
chine i before job j arrives; let Ci be the makespan of machine i at
the end. Similarly, let ρi (j) be the price on machine i before job j
arrives.
By definition, each online job j goes to machine i that minimizes
the costCi (j)+ pjsi + ρi (j). We assume that the jobs are indexed by
1, 2, . . . , |J |. ThusCi (j+1) denotes themakespan of machine i after
assigning job j.
As mechanismMPPR does not know when the online sequence
of jobs stops, we maintain a well-behaved schedule at all time. In
other words, for any job j and for any two machines i and i ′ with
si > si ′ , we have Ci (j) ≥ Ci ′(j).
4.3 Dynamic Prices on Machines
In this section, we show howmechanismMPPR sets dynamic prices
on machines such that (1) the prices are independent of the new
job; (2) the resulting schedule is well-behaved.
Consider the moment before job j arrives. First, if there are mul-
tiple machines with the same speed, then except for the one with
minimum makespan (break tie by the pre-fixed ordering), we set
the prices on other machines to be infinity. In other words, we
never assign the next job to these machines. For convenience of
discussion, we assume w.l.o.g. that the speeds of all machines are
different when the next job arrives.
Let πm = 0. For each machine i <m, define
πi :=
si
si+1
· (Ci+1(j) −Ci (j)) .
We set the price on machine i to be ρi (j) =
∑
l ≥i πl .
Note that by definition, the price ρi (j) depends only on the re-
current makespans Ci (j) of machines, which is irrelevant to the
size of the new job. In our mechanism, the price of going to ma-
chinem is 0, while the price of going to machine i , where i <m, is
πi more expensive than going to machine i + 1. Intuitively, the
prices on the machines incentivize the jobs to go to faster ma-
chines, unless the makespan of a slower machine is much smaller.
Example. Suppose there arem = 3 machines, which speed 1, 2
and 4. Let the online jobs have size 6, 4, 1, 0.6 (ordered by the arrival
order). By definition initially all prices on the machines are 0. Thus
the first job goes to the third machine (with speed 4), resulting in
a makespan of 1.5. Before the second job arrives, the prices on the
machines are 0.75, 0.75 and 0. Thus the second job (with size 4) still
goes to the third machine, as the objective is 2.5, strictly smaller
than 4 and 2.75, the objective when it goes to the first and second
machine, respectively. Then the prices are updated to 1.25, 1.25 and
0, and thus the third job (with size 1) goes to secondmachine. After
that, the prices become 1.25, 1 and 0, and the last job (with size 0.6)
goes to the second machine. It is easy to see that the schedule the
algorithm produces at every step is well-behaved.
Lemma 4.2. The above dynamic prices on machines result in a
schedule that is well-behaved, if jobs behave selfishly.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on the jobs: we show
that as long as the schedule is well-behaved, then after assigning
the new job, the schedule remains well-behaved.
By definition, the schedule is well-behaved when there is no job.
Now suppose that the schedule is well-behaved before job j arrives.
We show that after assigning job j to the machine with minimum
cost, the schedule remains well-behaved.
Suppose job j (of size pj ) goes to machine i . It suffices to show
that after the assignment, the makespan Ci (j + 1) of machine i is
no larger than that of machine i + 1, which isCi+1(j), as this is the
only place where well-behavior may cease to hold.
Given that i minimizes the cost of job j, we have
Ci (j) + pjsi +
∑
l ≥i πl ≤ Ci+1(j) + pjsi+1 +
∑
l ≥i+1 πl ,
which is equivalent to(
1
si
− 1si+1
)
· pj ≤ Ci+1(j) −Ci (j) − πi
= si ·
(
1
si
− 1si+1
)
· (Ci+1(j) −Ci (j)),
where the equality holds by definition of πi .
Rearranging the inequality, we have Ci (j) + pjsi ≤ Ci+1(j). In
otherwords, after assigning the new job j tomachine i , themakespan
of i is still no larger than that of i + 1. Hence the schedule remains
well-behaved after assigning the new job. 
Note thatwe can only prove that job j goes to amachine without
violating the well-behavior of the schedule. As there are possibly
many candidate machines job j can go to without violating this
property, the actual assignment depends on the makespans of all
machines. More specifically, mechanism MPPR cannot guarantee
that the new job will be assigned to the fastest or slowest candidate
machine (which makes the analysis more difficult).
4.4 Competitive Ratio
In this section, we bound the competitive ratio ofmechanismMPPR
by O(logm). As we will show later in Lemma 4.5, the competitive
ratio can also be upper bounded byO(pmax), wherepmax is themax-
imum size of an online job (recall that the minimum size of online
jobs is scaled to 1). Thus we can upper bound the competitive ratio
by min{logm,pmax}.
Consider the final schedule produced by mechanism MPPR, af-
ter assigning all jobs. Recall thatOPT is the optimal makespan and
ALG is the makespan of mechanism MPPR. Let OPT2 be the opti-
mal makespan when the speeds of all machines are rounded down
to powers of 2. Then immediately we haveOPT ≤ OPT2 ≤ 2 ·OPT,
as the optimal schedule before the rounding gives a feasible sched-
ule with makespan at most 2 · OPT after the rounding. Thus it
suffices to show that ALG = O(logm) · OPT2. In the following,
we assume that all machines have their speeds rounded down to
powers of 2.
For convenience of discussion, we order the machines such that
C1 ≤ C2 ≤ . . . ≤ Cm . Since the schedule is well-behaved, we also
have s1 ≤ s2 ≤ . . . ≤ sm . Then we have ALG = Cm . Let the speed
of the fastest machine be sm = 2
K .
Proof Outline. We first show that the makespans of any two ma-
chines with speed 2k and 2k+1 differ by O(OPT) at any moment
(Lemma 4.3). Intuitively, if the makespan of the faster machine is
ω(OPT) larger than that of the slower machine, then the price our
mechanism sets on the faster machine is ω(OPT) higher than the
price on the slower machine. Thenwe show that some job assigned
to the faster machine has a strictly smaller objectivewhen assigned
to the slowermachine, which is a contradiction. Equippedwith this
property, it suffices to show that only O(logn) difference speeds
matters: if a machine is 2O (logn) > n times slower than the fastest
machine, then its contribution to the total workload is negligible.
Let Rk = {i ∈ [m] : si = 2k } be the set of machines with speed
2k , and R≥k =
⋃
j≥k Rj be the machines with speed at least 2k .
We prove the following lemma, which is crucial for the proof of
the competitive ratio.
Lemma 4.3. Suppose Ci ≥ C for all machine i ∈ R≥k , for some
C > 0, then for all machine l ∈ R≥k−1, we have Cl ≥ C − 4 · OPT2.
Proof. It suffices to consider the non-trivial case when C ≥
4 · OPT2. Moreover, as we have Ci ≥ C for all machine i ∈ R≥k , it
suffices to consider the machines l in Rk−1. Let J ′ be the jobs that
contribute to the last 2 ·OPT2 increase of makespan onmachines in
R≥k . In other words, before the first job in J ′ arrives, themakespan
of each machine i ∈ R≥k is at most Ci − 2 · OPT2.
Observe that the total size of the jobs in J ′ is at least 2 · OPT2 ·∑
i ∈R≥k si , while the total size of jobs the optimal schedule pro-
cesses on machines R≥k is at most OPT2 ·
∑
i ∈R≥k si . Hence we
know that in OPT2, at least one of the jobs in J
′, say job j, is pro-
cessed on some machine not in R≥k . Since the processing time of
job j on machines in Rk−1 is at most OPT2, and the machines not
in R≥k have speeds at most 2k−1, we have pj ≤ OPT2 · 2k−1.
Now consider the time when job j arrives.
By definition, in our mechanism job j is assigned to some ma-
chine i ∈ R≥k . Moreover, we have
Ci (j) + pjsi ≥ Ci − 2 · OPT2 ≥ C − 2 · OPT2 .
Let i ′ ∈ Rk−1 be the machine with minimum makespan before
job j arrives. If Ci ′(j) ≥ C − 4 · OPT2 then we are done, as the
makespans of machines do not decrease.
Assume the contrary that Ci ′(j) < C − 4 ·OPT2. Then we have
Ci (j) −Ci ′(j) ≥ C −
(
2 ·OPT2 + pjsi
)
− (C − 4 · OPT2)
= 2 ·OPT2 − pjsi . (2)
Recall that for any machine l , we have
πl =
sl
sl+1
· (Cl+1(j) −Cl (j)) ≤
1
2
· (Cl+1(j) −Cl (j)),
and the price onmachine l is
∑
l ′≥l πl ′ . Hence the price onmachine
i ′ is at most 12 (Ci (t) −Ci ′(t)) larger than that of machine i .
Recall that the cost of going to machine i is given by
Ci (j) + pjsi +
∑
l ≥i πl .
On the other hand, the cost of going to machine i ′ is at most
Ci ′(j) + pj2k−1 +
1
2 (Ci (j) −Ci ′(j)) +
∑
l ≥i πl
≤Ci (j) + OPT2 − 12 (Ci (j) −Ci ′(j)) +
∑
l ≥i πl
≤Ci (j) + 12 ·
pj
si
+
∑
l ≥i πl ,
where the last inequality holds by Inequality (2).
Thuswe have a contradiction, as the cost is strictly smallerwhen
job j goes to machine i ′ while the mechanism assigns job j to ma-
chine i . 
Lemma 4.4. The scheduling algorithm is O(logm)-competitive.
Proof. Recall that ALG = Cm and RK contains the machines
with highest speed. For all i ∈ RK , we have Ci ≥ ALG − OPT2,
as no job has processing time strictly larger than OPT2 on the
fastest machines. By applying Lemma 4.3 recursively, all machines
in R≥K−logm (which are those of speed at least
sm
m ) have comple-
tion time at least ALG − (4 logm + 1) · OPT2.
If ALG − (4 logm + 1) · OPT2 ≥ 2 · OPT2, then the total size of
all jobs is at least 2 · OPT2 ·
∑
j∈R≥K−logm si . On the other hand, as
the optimal solution finishes all jobs within makespan OPT2, the
total size of jobs is upper bounded by
OPT2 ·
∑
j∈[m]
si ≤ OPT2 ·
(
m · smm +
∑
j∈R≥K−logm si
)
< 2 ·OPT2 ·
∑
j∈R≥K−logm si .
Hence we have ALG−(4 logm+1)·OPT2 < 2 ·OPT2, which implies
ALG = O(logm) ·OPT2 = O(logm) · OPT, as desired. 
In the following, we show that if the online jobs have bounded
sizes, i.e., pj = O(1) for all job j, then the competitive ratio of mech-
anism MPPR improves to O(1).
Let pmax = maxj∈J {pj } be the maximum size of an online job.
Lemma 4.5. The competitive ratio of the algorithm is O(pmax).
Proof. We first show that the difference in makespan between
two machines of similar speed are bounded (in terms of pmax).
First, observe that for any k ≤ K , the makespans of any two
machines in Rk differ by at most
pmax
2k
. For any machine i ∈ Rk and
i ′ ∈ Rk+1, we have
Ci ′ ≤ Ci +
(
1
si
+
1
si′
)
· pmax = Ci + 3si′ · pmax,
as otherwise the last job that goes to machine i ′ should have been
assigned to machine i .
As before, suppose that ALG = Cm . Let sm = 2
K , and i be the
slowest machine that has non-zero workload. Suppose si = 2
k ,
then any machine j with speed at least 2k has makespan at least
Cj ≥ Ci − pmaxsi ≥ Cm − pmax ·
∑K
l=k+1
3
2l
− pmax
2k
≥ALG − 3·pmax
2k
− pmax
2k
= ALG − 4·pmax
2k
.
Let 2k
′
be the highest speed of a machine that is slower than i ,
where k ′ ≤ k − 1. Then we have
ALG − 4·pmax
2k
≤ ( 1
2k
+
1
2k
′ ) · pmax.
Now we consider the optimal schedules.
If in the optimal solution any job is scheduled on amachine with
speed slower than 2k , then we have OPT ≥ 1
2k
′ , which implies
ALG ≤ ( 1
2k
+
1
2k
′ ) · pmax + 4·pmax2k = O(pmax) · OPT.
Otherwise we know that the optimal solution also schedules
jobs only onmachines with speed at least 2k , which impliesOPT ≥
ALG − 4·pmax
2k
, as otherwise the optimal solution cannot finish all
jobs. If the optimal solution schedules some job on a machine with
speed 2k , then we have OPT ≥ 1
2k
; otherwise we have OPT ≥
Ci ≥ 12k (since all machines of speed at least 2
k+1 has makespan
at leastCi ). In both cases, we have ALG ≤ OPT+ 4·pmax2k = O(pmax)·
OPT. 
Finally, by the design of mechanism MPPR, it is easy to see
that MPPR satisfies the following properties. Let Li be the set of
jobs assigned to machine i at the end of the mechanism. A mech-
anism is fair if for any two machines i and i ′ such that si = si ′ ,∑
j∈Li pj ≥
∑
l ∈Li′\{k } pl where k ∈ Li ′ is the last job assigned
to i ′; is anonymous if the scheduling depends only on the config-
uration π = (s1, . . . , sm) of machine speeds. In other words, if a
machine submits speed si while the configuration is given by π ,
then the jobs assigned to the machine is given by Li , where Li is
the set of jobs assigned to machine i according to permutation π .
Lemma 4.6. Mechanism MPPR is fair and anonymous.
5 TRUTHFULNESS FOR MACHINES
Although well-behavior is important on its own behalf, as it guar-
antees fairness, anonymity and symmetry (see the paragraph above
and Section 1.2) between machines, in this section, we show that
well-behavior is indeed useful towards achieving truthfulness against
selfish machines. We show several cases for which our mechanism
is truthful for both selfish jobs and machines. Recall that the ma-
chines are oblivious of the online jobs. Given that there are many
cases under which the mechanism is monotone, selfish machines
are more likely to be truthful, so as to get rid of the risk of a de-
crease in the utility.
Recall that to achieve truthfulness for machines, it suffices to
show that the mechanism is monotone [1]. First, we show that
when the online jobs have unit size, then mechanism MPPR is
monotone.
Lemma 5.1. Mechanism MPPR is truthful when jobs have unit
size.
Proof. Suppose si = 2
k for some machine i . Note that as long
as si ∈ [2k , 2k+1), the schedule remains the same. Hence it suffices
to show that if the claimed speed of machine i increases from 2k to
2k+1, the number of jobs assigned to it does not decrease. Assume
for the sack of contradiction that machine i is assigned L jobs with
speed 2k but assigned less than L jobs with speed 2k+1. Moreover,
we can assumew.l.o.g. that the L-th job assigned tomachine i when
si = 2
k is the last job of the whole sequence (otherwise we can
remove the later jobs to achieve a smaller counter-example).
In the following, we order the machines by their speeds: s1 ≤
s2 ≤ . . . ≤ sm .
First, observe that for any job j and any machine l <m, we have
Cl+1(j) ≤ Cl (j)+ 1sl , as otherwise the last job that goes to machine
l + 1 should have been assigned to machine l .
Since themakespan of machine i when si = 2
k+1 is at most L−1
2k+1
,
the workload on any machine in R≥k+1 is at most
L−1
2k+1
+
∑
l ≥k+1 12l <
L+1
2k+1
≤ L
2k
.
In other words, theworkload on anymachine inR≥k+1 decreases
after machine i claims a higher speed.
In the following, we show that the number of jobs assigned to
any machine with speed at most 2k does not increase.
First, for any machine in Rk , its makespan when si = 2
k is
at least L−1
2k
, which is larger than L−1
2k+1
, the upper bound on its
makespan when i claims speed 2k+1. It remains to consider ma-
chines with speed at most 2k−1. Fix any machine j with speed
sj ≤ 2k−1. We show that its workload does not increase.
Consider themoment when the L-th job goes to machine i when
si = 2
k . Since the job goes to machine i instead of j, we have
Cj +
1
2 ( L−12k −Cj ) +
1
sj
≥ L
2k
,
where 12 ( L−12k − Cj ) is an upper bound on the difference between
the prices of machine i and j. Hence we have
Cj ≥ L2k−1 −
L−1
2k
− 2sj =
L+1
2k
− 2sj .
In other words, when si = 2
k , the number of jobs on machine
j is at least ⌈ (L+1)sj
2k
⌉ − 2. On the other hand, when si = 2k+1, the
number of jobs on machine j is at most ⌊ (L−1)sj
2k+1
⌋. Observe that⌈ (L+1)sj
2k
⌉
−
⌊ (L−1)sj
2k+1
⌋
≥
⌈ (L+3)sj
2k+1
⌉
≥
⌊ (L−1)sj
2k+1
⌋
+ 1.
If ⌊ (L−1)sj
2k+1
⌋ = 0, then machine j is not assigned any job when
si = 2
k+1 (hence its workload does not increase); otherwise⌈ (L+1)sj
2k
⌉
− 2 ≥
⌊ (L−1)sj
2k+1
⌋
.
In both cases, the number of jobs assigned to machine j does not
increase when machine i claims a higher speed. 
Finally, we show that our mechanism is truthful for the case
m = 2.However, instead of rounding themachine speeds to powers
of 2, in the following proof, we assume that the speeds of machines
are rounded down to powers of 4.
Lemma 5.2. Mechanism MPPR is truthful whenm = 2.
Proof. As before, we prove that the mechanism is monotone.
Recall that by scaling we can assume that the slower machine has
speed 1. It suffices to show that if the speed of the slower machine
is increased, then its load does not decrease. The case when we
increase the speed of the faster machine is equivalent to the case
when we decrease the speed of the slower machine.
The case when the machines have the same speed 1 is relatively
easier. Let L ≤ R be the makespans (workloads) on the two ma-
chines. Suppose we increase the speed of one of the machine to 4,
then its workload is at least 45 (L + R), which is at least R if R ≤ 4L.
If R > 4L, then the last job, which is of size at least R − L > 3L,
must be assigned to the faster machine. Thus the workload of the
faster machine is at least (R − L) + 45 · 2L ≥ R.
Now suppose that the speed of machine 1 is 1, while the speed
of machine 2 is 4i , where i ≥ 1. We prove that for every job as-
signed to machine 1 when s1 = 1, if it is not assigned to machine 1
when s1 = 4, then the workload on the machine is no smaller than
its original workload after the assignment, which implies that the
workload does not decrease.
Let P be the size of the job and consider the moment when the
job arrives, when s1 = 1. Let L and R be the makespans of the two
machines, where L ≤ R. Since the job is assigned to machine 1, we
have P ≤ R − L.
Let L′ and R′ be defined similarly, when s1 = 4. Since P is not
assigned to machine 1 after the increase, we have L′ + P4 ≥ R′.
Then we have
4 · L′ ≥ 4 · R′ − P ≥ 4 · (R − 4·L′−L
4i
) − (R − L)
≥ 4 · R2 − R = R ≥ L + P ,
where in the second inequality we use L + 4i · R = 4 · L′ + 4i · R′.
Hence at any moment, the workload of machine 1 when s1 = 4 is
no smaller than its workload when s1 = 1. 
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study well-behaved mechanisms for online strate-
gic jobs. We first present two mechanisms that are truthful for
selfish jobs and machines, with competitive ratios m and 2smaxsmin ,
respectively. Then we consider well-behaved schedules and show
that any well-behaved mechanism must have a competitive ratio
at least Ω(√m).
We propose an almostwell-behaved dynamic posted-pricemech-
anism that is truthful for the jobs and has a competitive ratio of
O(logm). When the sizes of all jobs are bounded, the competitive
ratio of our mechanism improves to be constant. Finally, we show
that when all jobs have unit size or there are only two machines,
our mechanism is actually truthful against selfish machines.
We expect our algorithm and analysis to shed some lights on the
design of competitive mechanisms that are truthful for both the
selfish jobs and selfish machines. It is also interesting to improve
the ratio of O(logm) for almost well-behaved mechanisms.
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